Confidential per WAC 480-07-160 Exh. TRB-1CTr Docket UE-230172 Witness: Thomas R. Burns

#### BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

Complainant,

Docket UE-230172

v.

PACIFICORP dba PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Respondent.

#### PACIFICORP

#### **REDACTED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS R. BURNS**

March 2023 (REVISED April 4, 2023, and REFILED April 19, 2023)

### **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

I.	INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS		
II.	PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY		
III.	JIM BRIDGER UNITS 1 AND 2 NATURAL GAS CONVERSION		
	A.	Need	4
	B.	Modeling Assumptions	10
	C.	Price-Policy Scenario Results	14
IV.	ROCK	CREEK I AND II	14
	A.	Need	15
	B.	Assumptions and Methods	20
	C.	Price-Policy Scenario Results	29
V.	REPO	WERING FOOTE CREEK II-IV AND ROCK RIVER I	32
	A.	Need	32
	B.	Assumptions and Results	34
VI.	CONC	CLUSION	40

#### EXHIBITS

Exhibit No. TRB-2 Jim Bridger Analysis

Exhibit No. TRB-3C Rock Creek Analysis

Exhibit No. TRB-4C Foote Creek Analysis

Exhibit No. TRB-5 Rock River Analysis

1		I. INTRODUCTION AND QUALIFICATIONS
2	Q.	Please state your name, business address, and current position with PacifiCorp
3		d/b/a Pacific Power & Light Company (PacifiCorp or Company).
4	A.	My name is Thomas R. Burns, my business address is 825 NE Multnomah Street,
5		Suite LCT 600, Portland, Oregon 97232. I am currently employed as Vice President
6		of Resource Planning and Acquisitions for PacifiCorp.
7	Q.	Please describe your education and professional experience.
8	A.	I graduated from Illinois State University with a Bachelor of Science degree in
9		Economics. I joined PacifiCorp in 2007 and assumed the responsibilities of my
10		current position in September 2022. Over this period, I held several operational,
11		analytical and leadership positions within the Company. My previous role with
12		PacifiCorp was Director of Energy Supply Management, Operations, and Reliability.
13		In that role I was instrumental in the design and implementation of the Western
14		Energy Imbalance Market.
15	Q.	Briefly describe the responsibilities of your current position.
16	A.	I am responsible for aspects of PacifiCorp's resource planning and procurement
17		functions, which include the integrated resource plan (IRP), structured commercial
18		business and valuation activities, and long-term load forecasts. Most relevant to this
19		general rate case, I oversee the planning, analysis, and outreach processes that are
20		used to develop PacifiCorp's IRP, and the economic analysis that helps guide the
21		Company's resource acquisitions.

1		II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY
2	Q.	What is the purpose of your testimony in this case?
3	A.	I provide economic analysis that supports PacifiCorp's decisions to:
4 5 6 7 8		<ul> <li>Convert Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 to natural gas operations;</li> <li>Acquire the 190-megawatt (MW) Rock Creek I, and 400 MW Rock Creek II wind facilities (together, Rock Creek Projects); and</li> <li>Acquire and repower the 43 MW Foote Creek II-IV and 49 MW Rock River I wind facilities in Wyoming (the Repowered Facilities).</li> </ul>
9		I also summarize PacifiCorp's assessment of the projects from the 2021 IRP
10		and IRP Update, the 2021 Clean Energy Implementation Plan (CEIP), and discuss
11		customer benefits that result from these projects.
12	Q.	Please provide an overview of your testimony on Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2.
13	A.	As discussed below, my economic analyses indicate that converting Jim Bridger
14		Units 1 and 2 to natural gas is in the public interest and will generate benefits for
15		Washington customers. Compared to early retirement of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2,
16		natural gas conversion has a present-value revenue requirement differential
17		(PVRR(d)) customer benefit ranging from \$271.68 million to \$656.41 million, The
18		range of benefits depends on the timing and magnitude of early coal unit retirement
19		assumptions.
20		These substantial customer benefits are expected because the conversion is
21		anticipated to cost approximately \$20.8 million. While the assumed operational life of
22		a new gas peaking asset is longer than the assumed life of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2
23		once converted to gas-fueled generating units, the upfront capital required to convert
24		to natural gas is significantly less than installing a new gas-fired generating unit. The
25		Jim Bridger gas conversions represent a significant opportunity to maintain much

1		needed system capacity at a very low cost, during a period when there are growing
2		resource adequacy concerns throughout the region.
3	Q.	Please provide an overview of your testimony for the Rock Creek Projects.
4		As discussed below, my economic analyses indicate that both projects are in the
5		public interest and will generate benefits for Washington customers.
6		Before passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), customer benefits for the
7		Rock Creek Projects ranged from \$33 million when using medium natural gas and
8		medium Carbon dioxide (CO <sub>2</sub> ) assumptions to \$143 million for high natural gas and
9		high CO <sub>2</sub> assumptions. When factoring in the IRA, these benefits increased to \$185
10		million when using medium natural gas and medium CO2 assumptions and \$298
11		million for high natural gas and high CO2 assumptions. Conservatively, these benefits
12		do not assign any value to the renewable energy credits (RECs) that will be generated
13		by the Rock Creek Projects that can be used for compliance with the Clean Energy
14		Transformation Act (CETA), providing additional customer benefits.
15	Q.	Please provide an overview of your testimony for the Repowered Facilities.
16	A.	As discussed below, my economic analyses indicate that both projects are in the public
17		interest and will generate benefits for Washington customers.
18		Before passage of the IRA, customer benefits for Foote Creek II-IV ranged
19		from \$53.07 million when using medium natural gas and medium CO <sub>2</sub> assumptions to
20		\$80.8 million for high natural gas and high CO2 assumptions. When factoring in the
21		IRA, these benefits increased to \$76.49 million when using medium natural gas and
22		medium CO <sub>2</sub> assumptions and \$104.23 million for high natural gas and high CO <sub>2</sub>
23		assumptions. For Rock River I, customer benefits range from \$30.15 million when

1		using medium natural gas and medium CO2 assumptions to \$67.76 million for high
2		natural gas and high CO2 assumptions before adjusting for the IRA. When factoring
3		in the IRA, these benefits increased to \$54.09 million when using medium natural gas
4		and medium $CO_2$ assumptions and \$91.69 million for high natural gas and high $CO_2$
5		assumptions.
6		Conservatively, these benefits do not assign any value to the RECs that will be
7		generated by the Repowered Facilities, which can be used for compliance with
8		CETA, providing additional customer benefits.
9		III. JIM BRIDGER UNITS 1 AND 2 NATURAL GAS CONVERSION
10	Q.	Please describe the conversion of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 to natural gas.
11	A.	As described in the testimony of Company witness Brad D. Richards,
12		Exhibit No. BDR-1T, PacifiCorp is converting the Company's coal-fired Jim Bridger
13		Units 1 and 2, located near Point of Rocks, Wyoming, to run on natural gas. The units
14		are expected to be offline by January 2024, and converted to natural gas and in
15		service by May 2024. Consistent with the Company's 2021 IRP, the Company
16		assumes the converted Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 will serve Washington customers
17		until the end of 2029, and serve PacifiCorp's other service territories through 2037.
18		A. <u>Need</u>
19	Q.	Please provide an overview of the Company's IRP process.
20	A.	PacifiCorp's IRP process uses thorough analysis and modeling that measures cost and
21		risk to develop the Company's plans to provide reliable and reasonably priced service
22		for its customers. The primary objective of the IRP is to identify the least-cost,
23		least-risk portfolio of resources to serve customers in the future: this

2

"preferred portfolio"—is the portfolio that can be delivered through specific action items at a reasonable cost and with manageable risks.

3 The Company completes an IRP cycle every two years (odd-numbered years), 4 which includes preparing a full IRP every two years and an update to the full IRP in 5 the off years (even-numbered years). The Company submits both its IRP and IRP 6 Update to each of the six regulatory commissions in the states where the Company 7 provides retail service. Each IRP is developed through an open and public process, 8 with input from an active and diverse group of stakeholders, including state 9 regulatory commissions, state consumer-advocacy departments, customer-sponsored 10 advocacy groups, environmental-advocacy groups, resource-advocacy groups, 11 independent-power producers, project developers, other utilities, and customers. 12 During the public-input process, which typically spans at least a full year before the 13 release of a full IRP, PacifiCorp holds regular meetings with stakeholders to solicit 14 feedback on the Company's planning assumptions, methodologies, and model results. 15 Did the Company's 2021 IRP identify a need for additional resources to serve **Q**. 16 **PacifiCorp's customers?** 17 A. Yes. The primary focus of any IRP is to forecast the need for resources and evaluate 18 different strategies to meet that need over time. The Company's 2021 IRP shows that 19 PacifiCorp has a capacity deficit in all years of the planning horizon-starting at 20 1,071 MW in 2021 and increasing to over 6,600 MW by 2040. In 2025, the resource 21 need in the 2021 IRP is 1,627 MW. As described further below, this need has increased since the 2021 IRP was finalized. 22

1	Q.	How does the 2021 IRP preferred portfolio address the need for new resources?
2	A.	The 2021 IRP preferred portfolio represents PacifiCorp's least-cost, least-risk plan to
3		reliably meet customer demand over a 20-year planning period. Using a range of cost
4		and risk metrics to evaluate numerous resource portfolios, PacifiCorp selected a
5		preferred portfolio that reflects a cost-conscious plan that includes near-term
6		investments in renewable resources that can capture tax credits before they expire or
7		decrease and new transmission infrastructure to facilitate the interconnection and
8		delivery of these resources. These new resources and transmission investments are
9		lower cost than other resource and transmission alternatives and are necessary to
10		reliably serve our customers.
11	Q.	Can you describe the methodology that PacifiCorp used in the 2021 IRP to
12		analyze the economics of its coal units and derive the preferred portfolio?
13	A.	Yes. PacifiCorp incorporated a new and more advanced optimization modeling
14		system called PLEXOS. The PLEXOS modeling system provides three platforms
15		(referred to as Long-term (LT), Medium-term (MT) and Short-term (ST)), which
16		work on an integrated basis to inform the optimal combination of resources by type,
17		timing, size, and location over PacifiCorp's 20-year planning horizon. Please refer to
18		Company witness Rick T. Link's testimony for additional detail regarding PLEXOS
19		and the LT, MT, and ST platforms.
20	Q.	Has the Company prepared an update to the 2021 IRP?

21 A. Yes. On March 31, 2022, the Company issued its 2021 IRP Update.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 Integrated Resource Plan Update (Mar. 31, 2022) (<u>https://www.pacificorp.com/energy/integrated-resource-plan.html</u>).

#### Q. What is the purpose of the 2021 IRP Update?

2 A. The IRP update is a checkpoint on the 2021 IRP action plan, and ensures that changes 3 in the planning environment are considered between the two-year IRP planning cycle. 4 The 2021 IRP Update assessed whether evolving trends and events impact customers 5 and required changes to the action plan to deliver resources and transmission 6 investments. Relevant here, the 2021 IRP Update reflects resource planning and 7 procurement activities that occurred since the 2021 IRP, and present an updated 8 load-and-resource balance and an updated resource portfolio. 9 О. Did the 2021 IRP Update continue to show a need for additional generation 10 resources? 11 Yes. As discussed in Company witness Link's testimony, the need increased due to A. 12 an increase in forecasted load. The 2021 IRP Update shows a resource need in all 13 years of the planning horizon—starting at 1,584 MW in 2022 and increasing to 14 6,755 MW in 2040. In 2025, the resource need is 1,867 MW, an increase of 15 240 MW, or approximately 15 percent, relative to the resource need identified in the 2021 IRP. The higher load reflected in the 2021 IRP Update approaches the level 16 17 analyzed in the high-load sensitivity conducted in the 2021 IRP. The most recent load 18 forecast is even higher than that assumed in the 2021 IRP Update. 19 Moreover, now that the 2020 All Source Request for Proposals (2020AS RFP) 20 has ended, PacifiCorp was unable to execute firm contracts with all projects on the 21 final shortlist. Due to national tariff policies, global supply-chain issues, and 22 inflationary pressures, some projects on the 2020AS RFP final shortlist were unable 23 to move forward. Consequently, PacifiCorp's procurement was reduced by 902 MW

1	of solar resources and 497 MW of battery storage resources. This under-procurement
2	adds to our need for new resources.

#### 3 Q. How does the Company's 2021 IRP relate to the 2021 CEIP?

A. The CEIP represents a Washington-specific plan to meet the needs of the Company's
Washington customers. This includes developing interim and specific targets to meet
the ambitious goals of Washington's CETA, among others, creating customer benefit
indicators, detailing specific actions, estimating incremental costs for these actions,
and providing for robust public participation.<sup>2</sup> The economic analysis supporting the
CEIP is derived from the Company's IRP analyses.

# 10 Q. Do the Company's IRP and IRP Updates analyze the cost-effectiveness of 11 continued operation of its coal fleet?

12 A. Yes. These documents examine PacifiCorp's existing coal plants as part of

13 determining the least-cost, least-risk portfolio of resources to serve customers. This

14 examination includes analyzing the early retirement and conversion to natural gas of

15 coal plants while appropriately considering the potential avoidance of incremental

16 environmental compliance costs, which represents a potentially significant benefit in

17 early closure scenarios.

#### 18 Q. Were the retirement dates of any coal units driven by environmental

19

#### requirements in the 2021 IRP?

A. Yes, the retirement dates for Craig Unit 2, Hayden Units 1 and 2, and Naughton Units
1 and 2 are driven by environmental requirements.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> PacifiCorp's 2021 CEIP (Dec. 30, 2021) (https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/ceip/PAC-CEIP-12-30-21 with Appx.pdf).

#### 1 **Q**. Did PacifiCorp's preferred portfolio of resources in the Company's 2021 IRP 2 include the Jim Bridger conversion?

3	A.	Yes. In the 2021 IRP, the Company evaluated a number of scenarios specific to the
4		valuation of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 that excluded and included the conversion of
5		these units to natural gas fueled operation. The Company concluded that the portfolio
6		that eliminated gas conversion of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 was significantly higher
7		cost than the portfolio that included its inclusion across each of the price-policy
8		scenarios, <sup>3</sup> and included the resources as part of the least-cost, least-risk 2021 IRP
9		preferred portfolio. <sup>4</sup>
10	Q.	Please describe key factors for including the Jim Bridger conversion in the 2021
11		IRP preferred portfolio.
12	A.	The Company evaluated several alternatives, including the addition of new renewable
13		generation resources, alternative coal unit retirement timing, regional haze

- 14 compliance operating limits, and gas conversions or installation of carbon capture,
- 15 utilization and storage. On a risk-adjusted basis, the portfolio without natural gas
- 16 conversion of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 results in approximately \$469 million higher
- 17 costs than the preferred portfolio.
- 18 Was the Jim Bridger conversion included in the 2021 IRP Update? 0.
- 19 Yes. The conversion of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 were included in the preferred A.
- 20

portfolio identified in the 2021 IRP Update.<sup>5</sup> This is consistent with the substantial

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 IRP, Vol. 1, at 270 (Sept. 1, 2021) (https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resourceplan/2021-irp/Volume%201%20-%209.15.2021%20Final.pdf).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> *Id.* at Ch. 1 Action Plan, Action Item 1c, at 24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 IRP Update, Ch. 7 Action Plan Status update, Action Item 1c, at 98 (https://www.pacificorp.com/content/dam/pcorp/documents/en/pacificorp/energy/integrated-resourceplan/2021 IRP Update.pdf).

1		and increased need for additional generation resources first identified in the 2021
2		IRP, and then confirmed in the 2021 IRP Update.
3	Q.	Was the Jim Bridger conversion addressed in the 2021 draft and final CEIPs?
4	A.	Yes. The Company's draft CEIP noted that economic analysis supported converting
5		Jim Bridger units to natural gas, including a statement that the Company did not
6		anticipate allocating any of the converted Jim Bridger units to Washington. <sup>6</sup>
7		However, the Company received public comments from various stakeholders,
8		including the Alliance of Western Energy Consumers and Washington Utilities &
9		Transportation Commission (Commission) Staff, questioning this assumption. <sup>7</sup> In
10		response to this feedback, the Company's final CEIP removed the statement. <sup>8</sup>
11		B. <u>Modeling Assumptions</u>
11 12	Q.	B. <u>Modeling Assumptions</u> Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in the
	Q.	
12	<b>Q.</b> A.	Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in the
12 13		Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in the economic analysis for Jim Bridger.
12 13 14		Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in the economic analysis for Jim Bridger. The economic analysis of Jim Bridger included five different price
12 13 14 15		Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in theeconomic analysis for Jim Bridger.The economic analysis of Jim Bridger included five different pricepolicy-scenarios—medium natural gas prices paired with medium CO2 prices (MM);
12 13 14 15 16		Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in theeconomic analysis for Jim Bridger.The economic analysis of Jim Bridger included five different pricepolicy-scenarios—medium natural gas prices paired with medium CO2 prices (MM);low natural gas prices without a CO2 price (LN); medium natural gas prices without a
12 13 14 15 16 17		<ul> <li>Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in the</li> <li>economic analysis for Jim Bridger.</li> <li>The economic analysis of Jim Bridger included five different price</li> <li>policy-scenarios—medium natural gas prices paired with medium CO<sub>2</sub> prices (MM);</li> <li>low natural gas prices without a CO<sub>2</sub> price (LN); medium natural gas prices without a</li> <li>CO<sub>2</sub> price (MN); high natural gas prices paired with high CO<sub>2</sub> prices (HH); and under</li> </ul>

<sup>6</sup> In re PacifiCorp's CEIP, Docket No. 210829, Draft CEIP, at 16 (Nov. 01, 2021)
 <u>(https://apiproxy.utc.wa.gov/cases/GetDocument?docID=4&year=2021&docketNumber=210829</u>).
 <sup>7</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 CEIP, Stakeholder Input and Responses, comments 241, 329.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Compare PacifiCorp Draft CEIP, at 16, with PacifiCorp's Final CEIP, at 19.

1	These assumptions can influence the value of system energy, the dispatch of
2	system resources, and PacifiCorp's resource mix. Consequently, wholesale-power
3	prices and CO2 policy assumptions affect net-power cost (NPC) benefits, non-NPC
4	variable-cost benefits, and system fixed-cost benefits associated with the natural-gas
5	conversion. Because wholesale power prices and CO2 policy outcomes are both
6	uncertain and important drivers to the economic analysis, it is important to evaluate a
7	range of assumptions for these variables. The natural gas and CO2 price assumptions
8	are summarized in Table 1.

Henry Hub Natural **Price-Policy CO<sub>2</sub> Price Description Gas Price** Scenario (Levelized \$/MMBtu)\* \$9.93/ton starting in 2025 rising to MM \$4.44 \$57.94/ton in 2040 LN \$2.94 None \$4.44 MN None \$22.57/ton starting in 2025 rising to ΗH \$5.64 \$1<u>02.48/ton in 2040</u> \$74.10/ton starting 2021 rising to SCGHG \$4.44 \$150.38/ton in 2040 \*Nominal levelized Henry Hub natural gas price from 2025 through 2040.

**Table 1. Jim Bridger Price-Policy Assumptions** 

9 Q. Please describe the natural-gas price assumptions used in the price-policy

#### 10 scenarios.

11 A. The medium natural gas price assumptions are from PacifiCorp's official forward

- 12 price curve (OFPC) dated March 31, 2021, which was the most current OFPC
- 13 available when the modeling inputs were developed. The first 36 months of the OFPC
- 14 reflect market forwards at the close of a given trading day, April 2021 is the prompt

1		month in this analysis. As such, these 36 months are market forwards as of May 2021.
2		The blending period (months 37 through 48) is calculated by averaging the
3		month-on-month market forwards from the prior year with the month-on-month
4		fundamentals-based price from the subsequent year. The fundamentals portion of the
5		natural gas OFPC reflects Aurora-forecasted prices.
6	Q.	Please describe the CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions used in the price-policy scenarios.
7	A.	PacifiCorp used four different CO2 price scenarios-zero, medium, high, and a price
8		forecast that aligns with the SCGHG. The medium and high scenarios are derived
9		from a survey of third-party industry experts, including IHS CERA, and Wood
10		Mackenzie and the Energy Information Administration as well as CO2 price
11		assumptions used by peer utilities. Both scenarios apply a CO2 price as a tax
12		beginning 2025. PacifiCorp incorporated the SCGHG that is assumed to start in 2021,
13		and the SCGHG price is reflected in market prices and dispatch costs for the purposes
14		of developing each portfolio (i.e., incorporated into capacity expansion optimization
15		modeling).
16	Q.	How did PacifiCorp pair the natural gas and CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions for
17		purposes of its analysis of Jim Bridger?
18	A.	Scenarios pairing medium gas prices with alternative CO2 price assumptions reflect
19		OFPC forwards through April 2024 before transitioning to a fundamentals forecast.
20		Scenarios using high or low gas prices, regardless of CO2 price assumptions, do not
21		incorporate any market forwards because these scenarios are designed to reflect an
22		alternative view to that of the market. As such, the low and high natural gas price
23		scenarios are purely fundamental forecasts. Low and high natural gas price scenarios

2

are also derived from expert third-party, multi-client "off-the-shelf" subscription services.

#### 3 О. Does including potential future CO<sub>2</sub> costs reflect prudent utility planning? 4 Yes. The Company's price-policy scenarios include varying levels of assumed CO<sub>2</sub> A. 5 costs to reflect the fact it is more likely than not that some policy will exist that will 6 drive reduced emissions over the life of Jim Bridger. When determining CO<sub>2</sub> costs 7 used for planning purposes, the Company strives to ensure that it is not an outlier as 8 discussed above, and the medium price is within a reasonable range used by the 9 industry to assess risk and conduct prudent resource planning. The most recent 10 example of this trend is the Environmental Protection Agency's proposed Ozone 11 Transport Rule (OTR) restricting nitrogen oxide (NO<sub>x</sub>) emissions from power plants 12 and other industrial sources. This rule could impose new environmental compliance 13 obligations beginning in 2023 and 2024 on coal units in Utah and Wyoming, 14 respectively, with more severe limitations applicable in both states by 2026. 15 Are the modeled CO<sub>2</sub> costs intended to represent a literal carbon tax? **Q**. 16 No. The modeled CO<sub>2</sub> costs are not intended to explicitly account for a future tax on A. 17 CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. Rather, these costs capture the effect of policies incentivizing reduced 18 emissions through benefits or imposing costs through penalties or other costs 19 resulting from market dynamics driving the need for zero-emission resources or 20 customer preferences. 21 How were these portfolios examined for economic viability? **Q**. 22 A. The Company's five price-policy scenarios were analyzed to provide a deterministic

23 PVRR(d), a risk-adjusted PVRR(d), and the levelized benefits or costs of Jim Bridger

1		Units 1 and 2 on a dollar-per-megawatt-hour (MWh) basis. These price-policy
2		scenarios are discussed below.
3		C. Price-Policy Scenario Results
4	Q.	Please summarize the PVRR(d) and levelized results for Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2.
5	A.	Table 2 summarizes the PVRR(d) between cases, with and without Jim Bridger Units
6		1 and 2.9

Price-Policy Scenario	PVRR(d) (\$ million)	Net Benefit (\$/MWh)
HH	(\$515.20)	(\$321.79)
MN	(\$595.67)	(\$609.59)
MM	(\$656.41)	(\$174.87)
LN	(\$378.79)	(\$237.21)
MM- SCGHG	(\$271.68)	(\$17.57)

Table 2. Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 (Benefits)/Costs

7		Converting Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2 to operate on natural gas is expected to
8		deliver \$656.41 million in present-value net customer benefits in the MM scenario,
9		\$515.20 million in the HH scenario, and \$271.68 million in the MM-SCGHG
10		scenario. Under the MM, HH and MM-SCGHG scenarios, nominal levelized net
11		benefits are \$174.87/MWh, \$312.79/MWh, and \$17.57/MWh, respectively. Company
12		forecasting and the relative magnitude of benefits over costs across these scenarios, as
13		well as near-term resource need and the ability of the project to reduce the
14		Company's reliance, strongly support the conversion of Jim Bridger Units 1 and 2.
15		IV. ROCK CREEK I AND II
16	Q.	Please describe the acquisition of the Rock Creek Projects.
17	A.	As described in the testimony of Company witness Ryan D. McGraw, Exhibit

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> Exhibit No. TRB-2 Jim Bridger Analysis

1		RDM-1T, PacifiCorp is acquiring 190 MW Rock Creek I and 400 MW Rock Creek II
2		facilities. Both projects will be built by Invenergy under build-transfer agreements
3		(BTAs), and will be transferred to the Company on completion of the projects. My
4		testimony below provides the economic justification for the Company's decision to
5		acquire both projects.
6		A. <u>Need</u>
7	Q.	Does PacifiCorp have a need for The Rock Creek Projects?
8	A.	Yes. As discussed above, PacifiCorp's 2021 IRP identifies a significant need for new
9		resources over the near term. This need grew when the Company prepared its
10		2021 IRP Update. And as discussed below, this need has grown further due to an
11		updated load forecast and due to an under procurement of new solar and battery
12		resources from the 2020AS RFP.
13	Q.	Are the Rock Creek Projects a part of the 2021 preferred portfolio?
14	A.	Yes. As discussed above, the 2021 IRP preferred portfolio includes 1,792 MW of new
15		wind generation resulting from the 2020AS RFP, which includes 590 MW from Rock
16		Creek I and II. <sup>10</sup>
17	Q.	Please describe key factors that support including the Rock Creek Projects in
18		PacifiCorp's 2021 IRP preferred portfolio.
19	A.	The Rock Creek Projects are expected to meet the Company's near-term resource
20		need and provide significant customer benefits by providing zero-fuel cost generation
21		and substantial PTC benefits, while mitigating risks associated with future regulation
22		of carbon-emitting resources.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *Id.* at Vol. I, Ch. 9.

1	Q.	Please describe the reliability benefits of projects like the Rock Creek Projects.
2	A.	Acquiring the Rock Creek Projects reduces the Company's exposure to price and
3		volume volatility by reducing the need for market purchases. Increased reliance on
4		the market exposes customers to price volatility and price spikes that occur when the
5		region experiences severe weather events or system disruptions. Such events increase
6		net power costs, and the magnitude of increase is directly proportional to the volume
7		of purchases needed. In short, there is no guarantee that there will be a seller when
8		PacifiCorp needs to make a short-term purchase to serve its load. This risk also exists
9		for firm forward market purchases, where the seller could cut scheduled deliveries
10		and accept liquidated damages if they do not have sufficient supply to meet their
11		contractual obligations of the sale. As discussed in Company witness Link's
12		testimony, WECC and NERC reliability studies highlight the risks of resource
13		shortfalls across the region in the coming years.
14	Q.	How do these studies relate to the Rock Creek Projects?
15	A.	Each of these studies confirm the generally accepted understanding that the west is
16		facing increasing resource adequacy risks in the near term. More recently, NERC
17		further confirmed these findings and warned in its 2022 Summer Reliability
18		Assessment that several regions in North America were at high or elevated risk of
19		power outages this past summer due to above-normal temperatures and drought
20		conditions, particularly in the western half of Canada and the United States. <sup>11</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> 2022 Summer Reliability Assessment, North American Electric Reliability Corporation (May 2022) (https://www.nerc.com/pa/RAPA/ra/Reliability%20Assessments%20DL/NERC\_SRA\_2022.pdf).

1		The Rock Creek Projects will help mitigate against the risk that there may be
2		inadequate supply to support market purchases and reduce exposure to price spikes in
3		periods where demand threatens to exceed supply for market purchases.
4	Q.	Were the Rock Creek Projects selected in the 2020AS RFP?
5	A.	Yes. As discussed in Company witness Link's testimony, the 2020AS RFP final
6		shortlist included six final shortlist bids representing over 1,600 MW of wind
7		generation that seek to interconnect to PacifiCorp's transmission system. These bids
8		include the Rock Creek Projects, which were the only two bids that are not PPAs.
9	Q.	Following their selection to the 2020AS RFP final shortlist, did the Company
10		begin negotiating the BTA for the Rock Creek Projects?
11	A.	Yes. Both Rock Creek I and Rock Creek II were proposed by the same developer
12		(Invenergy) and, as discussed by Company witness McGraw, the Company engaged
13		in BTA negotiations with Invenergy for both projects.
14	Q.	Were these negotiations impacted by current economic conditions?
15	A.	Yes. Bidder development efforts were challenged by importation restrictions related
16		to China, COVID-19 international impacts, and hostilities in Ukraine that created
17		significant logistics and supply chain challenges associated with solar panels, wind
18		turbines, lithium batteries, transformers, and many balance-of-plant materials. As a
19		result, many developers have been forced to abandon established supply chains and
20		revert to new suppliers (if available), that has materially impacted overall renewable
21		power plant pricing and commitments toward project in-service dates.
22		Given PacifiCorp's need for generation resources, PacifiCorp allowed pricing
23		adjustments from all final shortlist projects from the 2020AS RFP, as well as limited

1		extensions to commercial operations dates. Despite this additional flexibility, some of
2		the bids from the final shortlist were unable to provide firm prices and were not
3		available for selection. As noted earlier, this contributed to an under procurement of
4		902 MW of solar capacity and 497 MW of battery capacity.
5	Q.	Have current economic conditions impacted costs for the Rock Creek Projects
6		relative to the costs offered in the initial bids that were used to establish the final
7		shortlist?
8	А.	Yes. Given the market dynamics discussed above, the overall costs for the Rock
9		Creek Projects have increased from their bids in the 2020AS RFP. The economic
10		analysis below is based on updated project costs.
11	Q.	Were there any additional benefits associated with the Rock Creek Projects that
12		offset the increased costs?
12 13	A.	offset the increased costs? Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the
	A.	
13	A.	Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the
13 14	A.	Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the Rock Creek Projects qualified for a 60 percent PTC through the first ten years of
13 14 15	A.	Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the Rock Creek Projects qualified for a 60 percent PTC through the first ten years of operation. As a result of the IRA, the economic analysis in this case reflects the value
13 14 15 16	А. <b>Q.</b>	Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the Rock Creek Projects qualified for a 60 percent PTC through the first ten years of operation. As a result of the IRA, the economic analysis in this case reflects the value of the 110 percent PTC, in addition to the updated project costs. These updates cause
13 14 15 16 17		Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the Rock Creek Projects qualified for a 60 percent PTC through the first ten years of operation. As a result of the IRA, the economic analysis in this case reflects the value of the 110 percent PTC, in addition to the updated project costs. These updates cause a significant and positive change in the economic benefits of the Rock Creek Projects.
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> </ol>	Q.	Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the Rock Creek Projects qualified for a 60 percent PTC through the first ten years of operation. As a result of the IRA, the economic analysis in this case reflects the value of the 110 percent PTC, in addition to the updated project costs. These updates cause a significant and positive change in the economic benefits of the Rock Creek Projects. <b>Have current economic drivers also impacted the Company's resource needs?</b>
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> </ol>	Q.	Yes. PacifiCorp's original economic analysis in the 2020AS RFP assumed that the Rock Creek Projects qualified for a 60 percent PTC through the first ten years of operation. As a result of the IRA, the economic analysis in this case reflects the value of the 110 percent PTC, in addition to the updated project costs. These updates cause a significant and positive change in the economic benefits of the Rock Creek Projects. <b>Have current economic drivers also impacted the Company's resource needs?</b> Yes. While the costs of 2020AS RFP bids have increased, the Company's resource

1		non-market resource in the region capable of achieving commercial operation by
2		2025. Meeting this near-term need with physical assets that will provide incremental
3		generation capacity effectively limits the Company's options to bidders in the
4		2020AS RFP.
5		Therefore, the 2020AS RFP bids and the Rock Creek Projects remain
6		necessary to reliably serve customers, including customers in Wyoming, and the
7		Rock Creek Projects' selection in the RFP confirms it is part of the least-cost, least-
8		risk resources available to meet the Company's need.
9	Q.	Has the Company prepared an update to the 2021 IRP?
10	А.	Yes. On March 31, 2022, the Company issued its 2021 IRP Update. <sup>12</sup>
11	Q.	Were the Rock Creek Projects included in the Company's 2021 IRP Update
12		preferred portfolio?
13	A.	Yes. <sup>13</sup>
14	Q.	What other important updates were included in the 2021 IRP Update modeling?
15	А.	As discussed in Chapter 5 of the 2021 IRP Update, key updates in addition to the
16		load-and-resource balance include the resource changes due to 2020AS RFP activity,
17		which is discussed further below. Importantly, the EPA's pre-publication version of
18		
10		the OTR, released on March 11, 2022, was not modeled in the 2021 IRP Update.
19	Q.	
	Q.	the OTR, released on March 11, 2022, was not modeled in the 2021 IRP Update.
19	<b>Q.</b> A.	the OTR, released on March 11, 2022, was not modeled in the 2021 IRP Update. Does the 2021 IRP Update consider the reliability issues related to reliance on

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 Integrated Resource Plan Update (Mar. 31, 2022).
<sup>13</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 IRP Update, Ch. 7, Action Item 2e, at 103 (Mar. 31, 2022).

1		Update's preferred portfolio shows generally lower market purchases in the first five
2		years relative to the 2021 IRP preferred portfolio. <sup>14</sup>
3	Q.	Were the Rock Creek Projects considered in the Company's 2021 CEIP?
4	А.	Yes. <sup>15</sup>
5		B. <u>Assumptions and Methods</u>
6	Q.	Please summarize the natural gas and CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions used in the
7		economic analysis of the Rock Creek Projects.
8	A.	The economic analysis of the Rock Creek Projects included three price-policy
9		scenarios—the MM, MN, and LN price-policy scenarios. <sup>16</sup> These assumptions can
10		influence the value of system energy, the dispatch of system resources, and
11		PacifiCorp's resource mix. Consequently, wholesale-power prices and CO2 policy
12		assumptions affect NPC benefits, non-NPC variable-cost benefits, and system
13		fixed-cost benefits associated with the Rock Creek Projects. Because wholesale
14		power prices and CO <sub>2</sub> policy outcomes are both uncertain and important drivers to the
15		economic analysis, it is important to evaluate a range of assumptions for these
16		variables. Table 3 summarizes the price-policy scenarios used to analyze the Rock
17		Creek Projects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> *Id.* at Figure 1.11.
<sup>15</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 CEIP, Ch. 3, Table 3.2 (Dec. 30, 2021).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> The Company did not include a high gas price/no CO<sub>2</sub>, high gas/medium CO<sub>2</sub>, or medium gas/SCGHG price policy as these analyses would be less insightful. All scenarios have either higher avoided natural gas fuel costs or carbon prices, that each result in procuring more alternative resources, and greater savings and customer benefits from Rock Creek. This is intuitive, because higher natural gas costs or carbon prices decrease the demand for natural gas, but alternative emitting resources would still have a higher cost than Rock Creek, resulting in more incremental savings from resources like Rock Creek that have no variable fuel costs.

Price-Policy Scenario	Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Levelized \$/MMBtu)*	CO <sub>2</sub> Price Description
MM	\$4.52	\$12.10/ton starting 2025 rising to \$51.40/ton in 2040
MN	\$4.52	None
LN	\$2.92	None
*Nominal level	ized Henry Hub natural ga	s price from 2025 through 2040.

#### Table 3. Price-Policy Scenario Assumption Overview


### Q. Please describe the natural-gas price assumptions used in the price-policy scenarios.

3 The medium natural gas price assumptions are from PacifiCorp's OFPC dated A. 4 June 30, 2022, which was the most current OFPC available when PacifiCorp prepared 5 its modeling inputs for the 2020AS RFP. The first 36 months of the OFPC reflect 6 market forwards at the close of a given trading day (June 30, 2022, in this case). As 7 such, these 36 months are market forwards as of June 2022. The blending period 8 (months 37 through 48) is calculated by averaging the month-on-month market 9 forwards from the prior year with the month-on-month fundamentals-based price 10 from the subsequent year. The fundamentals portion of the natural gas OFPC reflects 11 Aurora-forecasted prices. 12 Q. Please describe the CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions used in the price-policy scenarios. 13 A. PacifiCorp used two different CO<sub>2</sub> price scenarios—zero and medium. The medium

- 14 scenario is derived from a survey of third-party industry experts, including IHS
- 15 CERA, and Wood Mackenzie and the Energy Information Administration as well as
- 16 CO<sub>2</sub> price assumptions used by peer utilities. The resulting CO<sub>2</sub> price is applied as a
  17 tax beginning in 2025.

Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Burns REVISED April 4, 2023, and REFILED April 19, 2023 Exhibit No. TRB-1CTr Page 21

1	Q.	Did PacifiCorp update its load forecast in its analysis of the Rock Creek
2		Projects?
3	A.	Yes. The Company used a sales and load forecast that was completed in May 2022.
4	Q.	How does the May 2022 forecast compare to the load forecast used in the 2021
5		IRP?
6	A.	Figures 1 and 2 show PacifiCorp's May 2022 load and peak forecast relative to the
7		2021 IRP before incremental energy efficiency savings. A higher load forecast is
8		being driven by new industrial and commercial customer growth, increased air
9		conditioning saturations and miscellaneous devices and electric vehicle adoption
10		expectations. The updated load forecast also accounts for updates to weather,
11		temperature, and line losses to account for the progression of historical data since the
12		load forecast that informed the 2021 IRP.
13		On average, over the 2023 through 2040 timeframe, forecasted system load is
14		up 13.6 percent per year and forecasted coincident system peak is up 14.1 percent per
15		year when compared to the 2021 IRP. Over that same timeframe, the average annual
16		growth rate for the May 2022 forecast, before accounting for incremental energy
17		efficiency improvements, is 2.04 percent for load and 1.66 percent for peak.



16,000 Annual Sysem Coincident Peak (MW) 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2021 IRP May 2022 2,000 0 2023 2025 2024 2026 2028 2029 2030 2032 2035 2036 2038 2040 2027 2033 2037 2039 2031 2034

Figure 2. Forecasted Annual System Coincident Peak

1	Q.	Has PacifiCorp incorporated the EPA's proposed OTR in its analysis of the
2		Rock Creek Projects?
3	A.	Yes. PacifiCorp modeled two primary components to reflect the OTR: NOx
4		allowance requirements for each of its units including penalties for units with high
5		emissions rates, and a dispatch target or shadow price for NOx allowances, which is
6		used to avoid producing NOx emissions during periods when the economic benefits
7		are relatively low. After running the model, PacifiCorp compared the results to
8		forecasts of its annual allocation of NOx allowances for Utah and Wyoming.
9	Q.	Please describe how the annual allocation of NOx allowances would work under
10		the proposed rule.
11	A.	The proposed rule calls for dynamic budgeting of NOx allowances in 2025 and
10		havend with evailable ellower and ellower demonstration a state based on

beyond, with available allowances allocated among resources within a state based on 12 13 the recent historical heat input and emissions rates of each resource. Under EPA's 14 proposed rule, the forecasted allocation of NOx allowances drops significantly in 15 2026, as EPA assumed that selective catalytic reduction ("SCR") installations at 16 eligible facilities would significantly reduce emissions by that year. PacifiCorp's 17 thermal facilities in Utah would be covered by the rule beginning 2023 and thermal 18 facilities in Wyoming could be covered by the rule beginning 2024.

19 While trading of NOx allowances among participating states is allowed, the 20 proposed OTR includes significant penalties if a state's emissions exceed 121 percent 21 of its annual allocation. Limited banking of NOx allowances is also allowed, but 22 emissions met via banked allowances may also be subject to penalties if a state's 23 emissions exceed 121 percent of its annual allocation. To avoid such penalties,

Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Burns REVISED April 4, 2023, and REFILED April 19, 2023 Exhibit No. TRB-1CTr Page 24

1		PacifiCorp's Nox emissions during the ozone season (May-September) in each state
2		cannot exceed 121 percent of PacifiCorp's forecasted allocation of NOx allowances
3		for that state.
4	Q.	Please describe how PacifiCorp developed NOx allowance requirements for each
5		of its units.
6	A.	In general, an allowance for one ton of NOx emissions would allow the holder of the
7		allowance to emit one ton of NOx. However, starting in 2027,17 the proposed OTR
8		also imposes a daily NOx emissions rate limit of 0.14 lb/MMBtu for each coal-fired
9		facility, and requires emitters to provide an equivalent of triple allowances for any
10		emissions that exceed that rate. For example, a resource with an emissions rate of
11		0.20 lb/MMBtu would have an effective allowance requirement of 0.32 lb/MMBtu. <sup>18</sup>
12		To calculate PacifiCorp's NOx allowance requirements under the OTR, starting in
13		2027 the modeled emission rates for coal resources whose emissions exceed
14		0.14 lb/MMBTU were grossed up to account for the additional surrender of
15		allowances.
16	Q.	Please describe how PacifiCorp developed a dispatch target to manage its Nox
17		allowance requirements.
18	A.	While trading is allowed under EPA's proposed OTR, the restrictions on inter-state
19		transfers limit the number of potential counterparties. PacifiCorp's generation fleet is
20		an appreciable portion of the electric generating units in both Utah and Wyoming, so
21		the potential counterparties that could have allowances available for sale within those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Coal units that currently have SCR installed must meet the daily backstop limit in 2024. Coal units that do not

currently have SCR installed must meet the daily backstop limit in 2024. Coal units to currently have SCR installed must meet the daily backstop limit in 2027. <sup>18</sup> Effective allowance requirement for resource with emissions rate of 0.20 lb/MMBTU: 100% \* 0.20 lb/MMBtu + 200% \* (0.20 – 0.14) lb/MMBtu = 100% \*0.20 + 200% \* 0.06 = 0.32 lb/MMBtu.

1	states is quite limited. With that in mind, PacifiCorp's current planning assumes that
2	it will comply with the OTR using only its own combined allocation of NOx
3	allowances, and is meant to ensure that its annual allowance requirements do not
4	exceed 100 percent of the sum of its Utah and Wyoming allowance allocations. When
5	combined with state-specific limits previously described, while either PacifiCorp's
6	Utah or Wyoming NOx allowance requirements could be up to 121 percent of that
7	state's allocation, any increase in one state would have to be accompanied by a
8	reduction in emissions allowance requirements from PacifiCorp resources in the other
9	state.
10	PacifiCorp's primary production cost analysis relies upon PLEXOS ST
11	modeling that identifies system costs for a single deterministic set of expected or
12	normal input conditions. In reality, and in stochastic modeling the Company performs
13	using the PLEXOS MT model, significant variations in inputs such as load, hydro
14	generation, and thermal availability are a normal course of operations. Each of these
15	inputs can unexpectedly increase PacifiCorp's need for NOx emission allowances.
16	Because banking and trading are limited under the OTR, variations in NOx emissions
17	that might otherwise average out over time must comply in every year and under
18	every set of conditions. As a result, the NOx allowances used under "normal" input
19	conditions will likely need to be somewhat below the forecasted limit to ensure
20	sufficient allowances are available to meet unexpected input conditions.
21	PacifiCorp's analysis indicated that using a NOx allowance dispatch target of
22	in the ST model would result in NOx allowance requirements that were
23	under PacifiCorp's forecasted allocation and would leave sufficient allowances to

1	meet a range of potential "above-normal" conditions. Whenever the incremental
2	value of using a high NOx emitting resources exceeds the dispatch target price, the
3	model will deploy the high NOx resource, rather than lower NOx alternatives, which
4	are typically gas-fired resources or market transactions. For a coal-fired resource with
5	a NOx emissions rate of 0.20 lb/MMBtu, the NOx dispatch target price means that the
6	resource would not be dispatched unless it provides at least in
7	incremental value relative to no NOx alternatives, or a proportional amount of
8	incremental value relative to lower NOx alternatives. <sup>19</sup>
9	The dispatch target price is used to direct the model to avoid emissions, and is
10	not a direct cost, as the Company would receive its allowance allocation free of
11	charge under the proposed rule. While the Company could potentially sell
12	allowances, there is little indication what market prices may prevail, and market
13	prices may be below this target. As a result, no direct costs or revenues for
14	allowances are included in the analysis. The allowance requirements resulting from
15	this dispatch target price vary over time as the OTR requirements take full effect and
16	as the Company's portfolio evolves. The Company's load forecast and other
17	modeling inputs also play a role in the resulting volumes. A comparison of the
18	allowance requirements for the scenarios relative and forecasted allowance
19	allocations is discussed in the Price-Policy Scenario Results section later in my
20	testimony.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> A 0.20 lb/MMBTU coal-fired resource would have a NOx credit requirement of 0.32 lb/MMBTU in 2027 and beyond, as detailed in footnote 22. A typical average heat rate for a coal-fired resource is 11 MMBtu/MWh.  $\div$  2,000 lb/ton \* 0.32 lb/MMBtu \* 11 MMBtu/MWh =

2

### Q. Please describe the modeling methodology PacifiCorp used in its analysis of the Rock Creek Projects.

3 A. Consistent with IRP modeling practices, the Company calculated a system PVRR by 4 identifying least-cost resource portfolios and dispatching system resources through 5 2040, which aligns with the 20-year forecast period used in the 2021 IRP and 2021 6 IRP Update. Net customer benefits are calculated as the PVRR(d) between different 7 simulations of PacifiCorp's system. One simulation includes the Rock Creek Projects, 8 and the other simulation excludes them. The simulation that includes both projects 9 includes transmission interconnection costs. When the two simulations are compared, 10 changes to system costs are attributable to both projects. These also include 11 simulations before passage of the IRA, and after to reflect the value of increased 12 PTCs. In all studies, the Gateway West and Gateway South transmission projects 13 discussed in Rick Link's testimony were assumed to be in-service, and beyond 2025 14 proxy resource options from the 2021 IRP are available to meet system needs. 15 Customers are expected to realize benefits when the system PVRR from the 16 simulation with the projects is lower than the system PVRR without. Conversely, 17 customers would experience increased costs if the system PVRR with the projects is 18 higher than the system PVRR without. 19 **Q**. Did PacifiCorp analyze how other assumptions affect its economic analysis of the 20 wind projects? 21 Yes. PacifiCorp analyzed sensitivities that quantify how changes in capital costs and A.

22 PTC values influence projected customer benefits.

#### C. Price-Policy Scenario Results

#### 2 Q. Please summarize the PVRR(d) results post-IRA.

A. Table 4 summarizes the PVRR(d) results for each price-policy scenario from the

combined projects after passage of the IRA.<sup>20</sup>

	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e) = (c) + (d)	(f) = (a) + (e)	(g) = (b) + (e)
Price- Policy Scenario	PVRR(d)	Risk- Adjusted PVRR(d)	110% PTC Update	Project Cost Update	Total Update	Updated PVRR(d)	Updated Risk- Adjusted PVRR(d)
MM	(143)	(163)	(197)	42	(155)	(298)	(318)
MN	(33)	(51)	(194)	42	(151)	(185)	(202)
LN	16	2	(195)	42	(153)	(137)	(151)

#### Table 4. Post-IRA (Benefit)/Cost of Both Wind Projects (\$ million)

3 Before adjusting for risk (Column (g)), system costs are lower when the wind projects 4 are included in the portfolio in all scenarios: ranging from a \$137 million customer 5 benefit under the LN scenario to \$298 million in the MM scenario. When adjusting 6 for risk (Column (g)), the benefits from the wind projects increase: ranging from \$151 million in the LN scenario to \$318 million in the MM scenario. The increase in 7 8 customer benefits from the 110 percent PTC is substantial, even when accounting for 9 the increase in project costs. This updated analysis supports the necessity of the wind 10 projects, and indicates they will produce robust customer benefits. As discussed 11 earlier, these benefits only increase under a high gas or a high CO<sub>2</sub> price-policy 12 scenario. 13 **Q**. How do the modeled OTR allowance requirements compare to PacifiCorp's

14 forecasted allowance allocation?

15 A. The annual allowance requirements in the ST-model results are generally slightly

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Exhibit No. TRB-3C Rock Creek Analysis

1	below a high estimate of PacifiCorp's allowance allocation. Based on the allocation
2	methodology identified in the proposed rule, this high allowance allocation would
3	likely require installation of SCR equipment at most of PacifiCorp's coal-fired
4	generating units that are not equipped with that technology. In the absence of
5	additional emission control equipment, PacifiCorp's allocation would be significantly
6	lower, and well below the allowance requirements from the ST-model results. The
7	high and low allocation forecasts and the ST-model results for the MM and MN
8	price-policy scenarios are shown in Confidential Figure 3. As shown, allowance
9	allocations could be significantly lower than what is assumed to be available in the
10	current ST-model results, which would further increase the value of generation from
11	resources without emissions, such as the Rock Creek Projects.

Confidential Figure 3. Forecasted OTR Allocation and Modeled Requirements




Exhibit No. TRB-1CTr Page 30

### Q. Would the Rock Creek Projects provide customer benefits even if construction costs are higher than expected?

A. Yes. For both projects, a one percent increase in the initial capital costs would reduce
PVRR benefits through 2040 by \$9.1 million. To negate the \$318 million in riskadjusted, post-IRA benefits under the MM price-policy scenario, project costs would
need to increase by 35 percent. To negate the \$202 million in risk-adjusted, post-IRA
benefits under the MN price-policy scenario, project costs would need to increase by
22 percent.

# 9 Q. Are the Company's economic analyses of the expected customer benefits from 10 the Rock Creek Projects conservative?

11A.Yes. The PVRR(d) results for the Rock Creek Projects do not reflect the potential12value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output from the renewable13projects enabled by both projects. Customer benefits for all price-policy scenarios14would improve by approximately \$14 million for every dollar assigned to the15incremental RECs that will be generated through 2040 by both projects. And these16RECs can also be used for CETA compliance purposes, providing additional17customer benefits.

18 Similarly, the Company's analyses understate forecasted coal coasts for 19 certain system resources, including the Dave Johnston plant. If corrected to include 20 the full costs of fuel supply for all plants, the Company's economic analysis would 21 demonstrate even higher benefits for the Rock Creek Projects. Additionally, the 22 natural gas and electricity prices in the Company's September 2022 OFPC are higher

1		than the values assumed in the June 2022 OFPC used in the Company's analysis,
2		which would similarly result in higher benefits for the Rock Creek Projects.
3		V. REPOWERING FOOTE CREEK II-IV AND ROCK RIVER I
4	Q.	Please describe the acquisition and repowering of the Foote Creek II-IV and
5		Rock River I wind facilities.
6	А.	As described in the testimony of Company witness Timothy J. Hemstreet, Exhibit
7		TJH-1T, PacifiCorp is acquiring and repowering the 43 MW Foote Creek II-IV and
8		49 MW Rock River I wind facilities. This involves installing approximately
9		11 modern Wind Turbine Generators (WTGs) at the Foote Creek facilities, and
10		19 WTGs at the Rock River I facility. These acquisitions and repowering will
11		increase the power generation from, and extend the service lives of, both facilities.
12		These new turbines will increase the power generation from the previous capability
13		and allow customers to benefit from these favorable wind sites. My testimony below
14		provides the economic justification for the Company's decision to acquire and
15		repower the Repowered Facilities
16		A. <u>Need</u>
17	Q.	Did PacifiCorp's preferred portfolio of resources developed in the Company's
18		2021 IRP include the Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I facilities?
19	A.	Yes. <sup>21</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> *Id.* at Ch. 1 Action Plan, Action Item 2b, at 25.

- Q. Please describe the key factors for including Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I
   in the 2021 IRP preferred portfolio.
- 3 Both projects are anticipated to be fully online and serving customers by 2024. This A. 4 timing enables both projects to deliver needed energy and capacity value for 5 customers before the availability of either new proxy resources or final shortlist 6 project generation expected to be enabled by the Energy Gateway South transmission 7 line as identified in the Company's 2020AS RFP. Without both projects, the risk of 8 shortfalls is increased as is reliance on energy markets. In their current states, the 9 existing Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I facilities are not operating as turbines 10 and have been removed pending the repowering of the sites. Repowering will allow 11 the facilities to once again provide energy and capacity to serve load and reduce 12 market reliance, while allowing the newly installed turbines to qualify for substantial 13 federal PTCs. 14 Were Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I included in the Company's 2021 IRP Q. 15 **Update?**
- 16 A. Yes.<sup>22</sup>
- 17 Q. Were Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I included in the Company's CEIP?
- 18 A. Yes.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> PacifiCorp 2021 IRP Update (Mar. 31, 2022).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> PacifiCorp's 2021 CEIP, at 21.

1		B. Assumptions and Results
2	Q.	Has the Company performed updated analyses of the Repowered Facilities after
3		filing the 2021 IRP?
4	A.	Yes. The Company performed a 30-year analysis of each project's economics through
5		end-of-life using its PLEXOS modeling system, the same modeling system used for
6		the 2021 IRP.
7	Q.	Please summarize the natural gas and CO2 price assumptions used in the
8		economic analyses for the Repowered Facilities.
9	А.	The economic analysis for each of the projects included four price-policy scenarios—
10		representing low, medium, and high natural gas prices, and zero, medium, high, and
11		the SCGHG CO <sub>2</sub> prices. The price-policy scenario that pairs medium natural gas
12		prices with medium CO <sub>2</sub> prices is referred to as the "MM" scenario, the price-policy
13		scenario that pairs low natural gas prices with a zero CO <sub>2</sub> price is referred to as the
14		"LN" scenario, the price-policy scenario that pairs high natural gas prices with a high
15		CO <sub>2</sub> price is referred to as the "HH" scenario, and the scenario that pairs medium
16		natural gas prices with the SCGHG is referred to as the MM-SCGHG scenario. While
17		the MM price-policy scenario represents the Company's "expected case" describing
18		likely future conditions, the LN, HH, and MM-SCGHG scenarios provide informative
19		analytical bookends scenarios.
20		Similar to the Company's Jim Bridger analyses, these assumptions can
21		influence the value of system energy, the dispatch of system resources, and
22		PacifiCorp's resource mix. Consequently, wholesale-power prices and CO <sub>2</sub> policy
23		assumptions affect NPC, non-NPC variable-cost benefits, and system fixed-cost

1	benefits associated with the Repowered Facilities. Because wholesale power prices
2	and CO <sub>2</sub> policy outcomes are both uncertain and important drivers to the economic
3	analysis, it is important to evaluate a range of assumptions for these variables. The
4	natural gas and CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions are summarized in Table 5.

Price-Policy Scenario	Henry Hub Natural Gas Price (Levelized \$/MMBtu)*	CO <sub>2</sub> Price Description
HH	\$5.64	22.57/ton starting 2025 rising to 102.48/ton in 2040
MM	\$4.44	\$9.93/ton starting in 2025 rising
LN	\$2.94	None
MM-SCGHG	\$4.44	\$74.10/ton starting 2021 rising to \$150.38/ton in 2040
*Nominal leveliz	ed Henry Hub natural gas	price from 2025 through 2040.

**Table 5. Price-Policy Assumptions** 

# 5 Q. Please describe the natural-gas price assumptions used in the price-policy 6 scenarios.

7	A.	The medium natural gas price assumptions are from PacifiCorp's OFPC dated March
8		31, 2021, which was the most recent OFPC available when the modeling inputs were
9		developed. The first 36 months of the OFPC reflect market forwards at the close of a
10		given trading day, May 2021 is the prompt month in this case. As such, these 36
11		months are market forwards as of May 2021. The blending period (months 37 through
12		48) is calculated by averaging the month-on-month market forwards from the prior
13		year with the month-on-month fundamentals-based price from the subsequent year.
14		The fundamentals portion of the natural gas OFPC reflects Aurora-forecasted prices.

1	Q.	Please describe the CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions used in the price-policy scenarios.
2	A.	PacifiCorp used four different CO2 price scenarios-zero, medium, high, and the
3		SCGHG. The medium scenario is derived from a survey of third-party industry
4		experts, including IHS CERA, and Wood Mackenzie and the Energy Information
5		Administration as well as CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions used by peer utilities. Both the
6		medium and high scenarios apply a CO <sub>2</sub> price as a tax beginning 2025. PacifiCorp
7		also incorporated the SCGHG that is assumed to start in 2021, and is applied such
8		that the SCGHG is reflected in market prices and dispatch costs for the purposes of
9		developing each portfolio (i.e., incorporated into capacity expansion optimization
10		modeling).
11	Q.	How did PacifiCorp pair the natural gas and CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions for
12		purposes of analyzing the Repowered Facilities?
13	A.	Scenarios pairing medium gas prices with alternative CO <sub>2</sub> price assumptions reflect
14		OFPC forwards through April 2024 before transitioning to a fundamentals forecast.
15		Scenarios using high or low gas prices, regardless of CO2 price assumptions, do not
16		incorporate any market forwards because these scenarios are designed to reflect an
17		alternative view to that of the market. As such, the low and high natural gas price
18		scenarios are purely fundamental forecasts. Low and high natural gas price scenarios
19		are also derived from expert third-party, multi-client, "off-the-shelf" subscription
20		services.
21	Q.	Please explain how you conducted your analyses.
22	A.	For both projects, the methodologies are consistent with the approach used to perform
23		the economic analysis of portfolios in the 2021 IRP. The system value of incremental

1		wind energy for each project is calculated from two PLEXOS ST model simulations
2		for a given price-policy scenario—one simulation with incremental wind energy and
3		one simulation without incremental wind energy. The system value of incremental
4		wind energy is then converted to a dollar-per- MWh value by dividing the change in
5		annual system cost by the change in incremental wind energy for both price-policy
6		scenarios through 2040. The value of wind energy is extended out through 2050 by
7		extrapolating the system values calculated from modeled data over the
8		2038-2040 timeframe. The assumed system value, expressed in dollars per MWh, is
9		applied to the incremental energy output associated with each of the wind repowering
10		projects.
11	Q.	Were your initial economic analyses of the Repowered Facilities conducted
12		before passage of the IRA?
13	A.	Yes.
14	0	
	Q.	How does the IRA impact your analyses of the Repowered Facilities?
15	<b>Q.</b> A.	How does the IRA impact your analyses of the Repowered Facilities? Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic analyses assumed that Foote
15 16		
		Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic analyses assumed that Foote
16		Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic analyses assumed that Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I qualified for 60 percent of available PTCs. After
16 17		Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic analyses assumed that Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I qualified for 60 percent of available PTCs. After passage of the IRA, the Company understands that the Repowered Facilities now
16 17 18		Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic analyses assumed that Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I qualified for 60 percent of available PTCs. After passage of the IRA, the Company understands that the Repowered Facilities now qualify for 110 percent of available PTCs. The Company has updated its economic
16 17 18 19		Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic analyses assumed that Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I qualified for 60 percent of available PTCs. After passage of the IRA, the Company understands that the Repowered Facilities now qualify for 110 percent of available PTCs. The Company has updated its economic analyses to reflect the new PTC value for both projects, and the results are reflected in
16 17 18 19 20	A.	Based on existing law, PacifiCorp's initial economic analyses assumed that Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I qualified for 60 percent of available PTCs. After passage of the IRA, the Company understands that the Repowered Facilities now qualify for 110 percent of available PTCs. The Company has updated its economic analyses to reflect the new PTC value for both projects, and the results are reflected in Tables 6 and 7 below.

1

IRA. This table also presents the same information on a levelized dollar-per-MWh

2 basis.<sup>24</sup>

Price-Policy Scenario	Pre-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)	Pre-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)	Post-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)	Post-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)
HH	(\$80.80)	(\$38/MWh)	(\$104.23)	(\$49/MWh)
MM	(\$53.07)	(\$25/MWh)	(\$76.49)	(\$36/MWh)
LN	\$17.09	\$8/MWh	(\$6.33)	(\$3/MWh)
MM-SCGHG	(\$142.77)	(\$67/MWh)	(\$166.19)	(\$78/MWh)

Table 6. Foote Creek II-IV (Benefits)/Costs

3	Before passage of the IRA, Foote Creek II-IV was expected to deliver
4	\$53.07 million in present-value net customer benefits in the MM scenario,
5	\$80.8 million in the HH scenario, and \$142.77 million in the MM-SCGHG scenario.
6	This is contrasted with \$17.09 million cost in the LN scenario. Under the
7	MM-SCGHG, MM and HH scenarios, nominal levelized net benefits are \$67/MWh,
8	\$25/MWh and \$38/MWh, respectively. Under the LN scenario there is a nominal
9	levelized net cost of \$8/MWh. Company forecasting and the relative magnitude of
10	benefits over costs across these scenarios, as well as near-term resource need and the
11	ability of the project to reduce the Company's reliance on market purchases, all
12	support acquiring and repowering the Foote Creek II-IV project.
13	After passage of the IRA, customer benefits increased substantially: Foote
14	Creek II-IV will now deliver \$76.49 million in present-value net customer benefits in
15	the MM scenario and \$104.23 million in the HH scenario. Importantly, the only
16	scenario where Foote Creek II-IV was expected to generate customer costs before
17	passage of the IRA-the LN scenario (\$17.09 million)-has transformed to a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Exhibit No. TRB-4C Foote Creek Analysis

1		\$6.33 million customer benefit. While the Company decided to move forward with
2		Foote Creek II-IV before passage of the IRA, the substantial post-IRA benefits
3		continue to support the Company's decision to acquire and repower the facilities.
4	Q.	Has the Company updated its analysis of Rock River I after filing the 2021 IRP?
5	А.	Yes. The Company updated its economic analysis in 2022 to support the Company's
6		decision to acquire and repower Rock River I, and these results are reflected below.
7	Q.	Please summarize the PVRR(d) and levelized results for Rock River I.
7 8	<b>Q.</b> A.	Please summarize the PVRR(d) and levelized results for Rock River I. Table 7 summarizes the PVRR(d) between cases, with and without Rock River I
	_	
8	_	Table 7 summarizes the PVRR(d) between cases, with and without Rock River I
8 9	_	Table 7 summarizes the PVRR(d) between cases, with and without Rock River I acquisition and repowering, for customer benefits before and after passage of the

	Table 7. r	lock River I (be	nents//Costs	
Price-Policy Scenario	Pre-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)	Pre-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)	Post-IRA PVRR(d) (\$ million)	Post-IRA Net Benefit (\$/MWh)
HH	(\$67.76)	(\$32/MWh)	(\$91.69)	(\$43/MWh)

(\$14/MWh)

\$4/MWh

(\$67/MWh)

12	Before passage of the IRA, Rock River I was expected to deliver
13	\$30.15 million in present-value net customer benefits in the MM scenario,
14	\$67.76 million in the HH scenario, and \$143.42 million in the MM-SCGHG scenario.
15	This is contrasted with \$8.82 million cost in the LN scenario. Under the MM-
16	SCGHG, MM and HH scenarios, nominal levelized net benefits are \$67/MWh,
17	\$14/MWh and \$32/MWh, respectively. Under the LN scenario there is a nominal
18	levelized net cost of \$4/MWh. Company forecasting and the relative magnitude of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> Exhibit No. TRB-5 Rock River Analysis

MM

LN

MM-SCGHG

(\$30.15)

\$8.82

(\$143.42)

(\$25/MWh)

(\$7/MWh)

(\$78/MWh)

(\$54.09)

(\$15.12)

(\$167.35)

1		benefits over costs across these scenarios, as well as near-term resource need and the
2		ability of the project to reduce the Company's reliance on market purchases, all
3		support acquiring and repowering Rock River I.
4		After passage of the IRA, customer benefits increased substantially: Rock
5		River I will now deliver \$54.09 million in present-value net customer benefits in the
6		MM scenario and \$91.69 million in the HH scenario. Importantly, the only scenario
7		where Rock River I was expected to generate customer costs before passage of the
8		IRA—the LN scenario (\$8.82 million)—has transformed to a \$15.12 million
9		customer benefit. These benefits only increase under a high gas or a high CO <sub>2</sub>
10		price-policy scenario.
11	Q.	Are the Company's economic analyses of the expected customer benefits from
12		Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I conservative?
12 13	A.	Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I conservative? Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the
	A.	
13	A.	Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the
13 14	A.	Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the potential value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output from the
13 14 15	A.	Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the potential value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output from the renewable projects enabled by both projects. Customer benefits for all price-policy
13 14 15 16	A.	Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the potential value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output from the renewable projects enabled by both projects. Customer benefits for all price-policy scenarios would improve significantly for every dollar assigned to the incremental
13 14 15 16 17	A.	Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the potential value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output from the renewable projects enabled by both projects. Customer benefits for all price-policy scenarios would improve significantly for every dollar assigned to the incremental RECs that will be generated through 2040 by both projects, and these RECs can also
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> </ol>	А. <b>Q.</b>	Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the potential value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output from the renewable projects enabled by both projects. Customer benefits for all price-policy scenarios would improve significantly for every dollar assigned to the incremental RECs that will be generated through 2040 by both projects, and these RECs can also be used for CETA compliance purposes, providing additional customer benefits.
<ol> <li>13</li> <li>14</li> <li>15</li> <li>16</li> <li>17</li> <li>18</li> <li>19</li> </ol>		Yes. The PVRR(d) results for Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I do not reflect the potential value of RECs generated by the incremental energy output from the renewable projects enabled by both projects. Customer benefits for all price-policy scenarios would improve significantly for every dollar assigned to the incremental RECs that will be generated through 2040 by both projects, and these RECs can also be used for CETA compliance purposes, providing additional customer benefits. <b>VI. CONCLUSION</b>

Direct Testimony of Thomas R. Burns REVISED April 4, 2023, and REFILED April 19, 2023 Exhibit No. TRB-1CTr Page 40

8	Q.	Does this conclude your direct testimony?
7		are prudent.
6		Rock Creek Projects, and acquire and repower Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I
5		determine that the Company's decisions to convert Jim Bridger 1 and 2, acquire the
4	A.	As supported by PacifiCorp's economic analysis, I recommend that the Commission
3	Q.	What is your recommendation?
2		substantial customer benefits compared to anticipated project costs.
1		repowering of Foote Creek II-IV and Rock River I, are necessary and will provide

9 A. Yes.

Exh. TRB-2 Docket UE-230172 Witness: Thomas R. Burns

#### BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

Complainant,

v.

PACIFICORP dba PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Respondent.

Docket UE-230172

# PACIFICORP

# **EXHIBIT OF THOMAS R. BURNS**

# Jim Bridger Analysis

# Table 2 Jim Bridger 1&2 Gas Conversion

	PVRR(d) Net (Benefit)/Cost (\$million)	Nom. Lev. Net Benefit (\$/MWh of Incremental Energy)
Medium Natural Gas, Medium CO2	(\$515.20)	\$321.79
Medium Natural Gas, No CO2	(\$595.67)	\$609.59
Low Natural Gas, No CO2	(\$656.41)	\$174.87
High Natural Gas, High CO2	(\$378.79)	\$237.21
Medium Natural Gas, SCGHG	(\$271.68)	\$17.57

Exh. TRB-3 Docket UE-230172 Witness: Thomas R. Burns

#### BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

Complainant,

v.

PACIFICORP dba PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Respondent.

Docket UE-230172

# PACIFICORP

## **EXHIBIT OF THOMAS R. BURNS**

**Rock Creek Analysis** 

Exhibit No. TRB-3 Rock Creek Analysis

Results (S milli

Estimated Annual Revenue Requi

						Í			ĺ												
Medium Gas, Medium CO2																					ľ
(Benefit) /Cost	PVRR(d)	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	$\vdash$	$\vdash$	2035	$\vdash$	2037	2038	2039	2040
Cost of Project	\$611	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$73	\$67	\$70	\$70	\$67	\$66	\$66	\$68			\$104		\$130	\$133	\$135	\$138
New Wind Capital Cost	\$438	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$22	\$49	\$51	\$51	\$48	\$48	\$48	\$50			\$85		\$102	\$104	\$106	\$109
Wind Run-Rate Fixed Costs	\$360	\$0	<b>S</b> 0	\$0	\$0	\$73	\$50	\$49	\$51	\$56	\$59	\$62	\$62			\$27		\$22	\$22	\$23	\$23
PTC Credits	(\$234)	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	(\$27)	(\$38)	(\$37)	(\$39)	(\$45)	(\$48)	(\$50)	(\$50)			(\$15)		\$0	<b>S</b> 0	\$0	\$0
Wind Tax	\$14	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2			\$2		\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2
Transmisison Network Wind	<b>S</b> 8	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1			\$2		\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2
Transmission OATT Credit	\$25	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b>	<b>\$</b> 4	\$4	\$4	\$4	\$4	\$3	\$3			\$3		\$3	\$3	\$2	\$2
Change in NPC	(\$171)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$27)	(\$38)	(\$39)	(\$31)	(\$18)	(\$18)	(\$22)	(\$22)			(\$34)		(\$38)	(\$42)	(\$51)	(\$71)
Change in Emissions	(\$75)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	( <b>S</b> 11)	(\$17)	(\$20)	(\$10)	(86)	(\$8)	(\$8)	(8)			(\$16)		(\$14)	(\$16)	(\$18)	(\$16)
Change in VOM & Driver Adjustments	\$8	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(S0)	(\$1)	(\$1)	(\$1)	(\$1)	(\$1)			(\$1)		(\$2)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$5)
Change in DSM	(\$20)	\$0	\$0	(S0)	(80)	(S0)	(80)	(S1)	(\$2)	(\$2)	(\$2)	(\$2)	(\$1)			(86)		(86)	(\$7)	(27)	(\$7)
Change in Deficiency	\$5	\$0	\$0	\$0	(80)	(S4)	(80)	(S0)	(\$2)	\$1	\$0	\$0	\$2			(80)		\$0	\$0	\$0	\$5
Change in System Fixed Cost	(\$502)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$28)	(\$63)	(\$63)	(\$63)	(\$64)	_		(\$38)		(\$108)	(\$108)	(\$109)	\$109)
Net (Benefit) /Cost	(\$143)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$32	\$11	\$9	(\$5)	(\$22)	(\$26)	(\$30)	(\$27)	\$125)	(\$21)	\$7	(\$28)	(\$39)	(\$43)	(\$52)	(\$64)
Risk Adjustment	(\$20)																				
Net (Benefit) /Cost with Risk Adjustment	(\$163)																				
Medium Gas, No CO2																					
(Benefit) /Cost	PVRR(d)	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	_	2030	2031	2032	_	_		_	2037	2038	2039	2040
Cost of Project	\$615	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$75	\$68	\$72	\$70		\$66	\$66	\$68	-				\$130	\$132	\$135	\$138
New Wind Capital Cost	\$441	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$22	\$50	\$53	\$51		\$48	\$48	\$50					\$102	\$104	\$106	\$109
Wind Run-Rate Fixed Costs	\$357	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$73	\$48	\$47	\$51		\$59	\$62	\$62					\$22	\$22	\$23	\$23
PTC Credits	(\$230)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$26)	(\$36)	(\$35)	(\$39)		(\$48)	(\$50)	(\$50)					\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Wind Tax	\$13	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1	\$2	\$2	\$2		\$2	\$2	\$2					\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2
Transmisison Network Wind [1]	\$8	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$0	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1		\$1	\$1	\$1					\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2
Transmission OATT Credit	\$25	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b> 4	<b>\$</b> 4	\$4	\$4		<b>\$</b> 4	\$3	\$3					\$3	\$3	\$2	\$2
Change in NPC	(\$104)	\$0	(80)	<b>\$</b> 0	(80)	(\$35)	(\$29)	(\$28)	(\$26)		\$15	\$12	(\$16)				-	(\$321)	\$82	\$89	\$125
Change in Emissions	<b>S</b> 0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0		\$0	\$0	\$0					\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Change in VOM & Driver Adjustments	S44	\$0	\$0	(80)	(80)	\$0	\$10	\$9	\$9		\$10	\$10	\$10					\$8	(\$11)	(\$11)	(\$8)
Change in DSM	(\$19)	\$0	\$0	(20)	(80)	(\$1)	(\$1)	(\$1)	(\$2)		(\$4)	(\$4)	(\$3)					(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)
Change in Deficiency	(\$1)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$3)	(S0)	(80)	\$1		\$10	\$8	\$3					(\$22)	\$0	\$0	\$2
Change in System Fixed Cost	(\$568)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$29)	(\$30)	(\$34)		(\$177)	(\$178)	(\$72)	\$76 (				\$406	(\$233)	(\$234)	\$237)
Net (Benefit) /Cost	(\$33)	\$0	(80)	\$0	(80)	\$35	\$18	\$22	\$18	(\$56)	(879)	(\$85)	(\$11)		(\$71) (	(\$38)	(\$28)	\$197	(\$33)	(\$25)	\$17
Risk Adinstment	(\$18)																				

(Benefit) /Cost	PVRR(d)	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028	2029	2030	2031	2032	2033	2034	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	204(
Cost of Project	\$615	\$0	\$0	80	\$0	\$75	\$68	\$72	\$70	\$67	\$66	\$66	\$68	\$70	\$71	\$104	\$127	\$130	\$132	\$135	\$138
New Wind Capital Cost	\$441	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$22	\$50	\$53	\$51	\$48	\$48	\$48	\$50	\$51	\$52	\$85	\$100	\$102	\$104	\$106	\$105
Wind Run-Rate Fixed Costs	\$357	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$73	\$48	\$47	\$51	\$56	\$59	\$62	\$62	\$63	\$64	\$27	\$21	\$22	\$22	\$23	\$23
PTC Credits	(\$230)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$26)	(\$36)	(\$35)	(\$39)	(\$45)	(\$48)	(\$50)	(\$50)	(\$51)	(\$52)	(\$15)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Wind Tax	\$13	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2
Transmisison Network Wind [1]	\$8	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$1	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2	\$2
Transmission OATT Credit	\$25	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$4	\$4	\$4	<b>\$</b> 4	\$4	\$4	\$3	\$3	\$3	\$3	\$3	\$3	\$3	\$3	\$2	\$2
Change in NPC	(\$104)	\$0	(80)	<b>\$</b> 0	(80)	(\$35)	(\$29)	(\$28)	(\$26)	\$18	\$15	\$12	(\$16)	(\$56)	\$1	\$3	(80)	(\$321)	\$82	\$89	\$125
Change in Emissions	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0
Change in VOM & Driver Adjustments	\$44	\$0	\$0	(80)	(80)	\$0	\$10	\$9	\$9	\$10	\$10	\$10	\$10	\$9	\$10	\$10	(\$1)	\$8	(\$11)	(\$11)	(\$8)
Change in DSM	(819)	\$0	\$0	(20)	(80)	(\$1)	(\$1)	(\$1)	(\$2)	(\$3)	(\$4)	(\$4)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)
Change in Deficiency	(\$1)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$3)	(80)	(80)	\$1	\$28	\$10	\$8	\$3	(\$41)	\$0	\$0	\$1	(\$22)	\$0	\$0	\$2
Change in System Fixed Cost	(\$568)	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$29)	(\$30)	(\$34)	(\$176)	(\$177)	(\$178)	(\$72)	\$76	(\$151)	(\$152)	(\$153)	\$406	(\$233)	(\$234)	(\$23)
Net (Benefit) /Cost	(\$33)	\$0	(80)	\$0	(80)	\$35	\$18	\$22	\$18	(\$56)	(879)	(\$85)	(\$11)	\$54	(\$71)	(\$38)	(\$28)	\$197	(\$33)	(\$25)	\$17
Risk Adjustment	(\$18)																				
Net (Benefit) /Cost with Risk Adjustment	(\$51)																				

Low Gas, No CO2																					
(Benefit) /Cost	PVRR(d)	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026 2	┝	-	2029 2(	2030 2	2031 2	2032 2	2033	┝	2035	2036	2037	2038	2039	2040
Cost of Project	\$613	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$74										\$104					\$138
New Wind Capital Cost	\$440	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$23										\$85					\$109
Wind Run-Rate Fixed Costs	\$357	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$71										\$27					\$23
PTC Credits	(\$231)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$26)		_	_	_	_				_	(\$15)					\$0
Wind Tax	\$14	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1										\$2					\$2
Transmisison Network Wind [1]	\$8	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$1										\$2					\$2
Transmission OATT Credit	\$25	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$4										\$3					\$2
Change in NPC	(\$65)	\$0	\$0	\$0	(80)	(\$19)	(\$28) (	(\$31) (	(\$2) (\$	(\$2) (\$	(\$3) (	(\$3) (	(\$2)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$3)	(\$1)	\$2	(\$4)	(\$2)
Change in Emissions	\$0	\$0	\$0	<b>\$</b> 0	\$0	\$0										\$0					\$0
Change in VOM & Driver Adjustments	(\$8)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0										(\$1)					(\$2)
Change in DSM	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0										\$0					\$0
Change in Deficiency	(86)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	(\$7)										\$0					\$1
Change in System Fixed Cost	(\$519)	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0				_	_				_	(869)	_		_		\$101)
Net (Benefit) /Cost	\$16	\$0	\$0	\$0	(80)	\$48		-	(\$30) (\$2	(\$33) (\$	(\$35) (\$	(\$36) (	(\$33) (	(\$32) (	(\$32)	\$1	\$24	\$28	\$32	\$28	\$34
Risk Adjustment	(\$14)																				
Net (Benefit) /Cost with Risk Adjustment	\$2																				

Exh. TRB-4 Docket UE-230172 Witness: Thomas R. Burns

#### BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

Complainant,

v.

PACIFICORP dba PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Respondent.

Docket UE-230172

# PACIFICORP

## **EXHIBIT OF THOMAS R. BURNS**

Foote Creek Analysis

#### Table 1 Foote Creek North 110%PTC

	PVRR(d) Net (Benefit)/Cost (\$million)	Nom. Lev. Net Benefit (\$/MWh of Incremental Energy)
High Natural Gas, High CO <sub>2</sub>	(\$104.23)	\$49/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, Medium CO <sub>2</sub>	(\$76.49)	\$36/MWh
Low Natural Gas, No $CO_2$	(\$6.33)	\$3/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, SCGHG	(\$166.19)	\$78/MWh

#### Table 1 Foote Creek North 60%PTC

	PVRR(d) Net (Benefit)/Cost (\$million)	Nom. Lev. Net Benefit (\$/MWh of Incremental Energy)
High Natural Gas, High CO2	(\$80.80)	\$38/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, Medium CO2	(\$53.07)	\$25/MWh
Low Natural Gas, No CO2	\$17.09	(\$8/MWh)
Medium Natural Gas, SCGHG	(\$142.77)	\$67/MWh

#### Table 1 Foote Creek North 110% vs 60%PTC

	PVRR(d) Net (Benefit)/Cost (\$million)	Nom. Lev. Net Benefit (\$/MWh of Incremental Energy)
High Natural Gas, High CO2	(\$23.42)	\$11/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, Medium CO2	(\$23.42)	\$11/MWh
Low Natural Gas, No CO2	(\$23.42)	\$11/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, SCGHG	(\$23.42)	\$11/MWh

Exh. TRB-5 Docket UE-230172 Witness: Thomas R. Burns

#### BEFORE THE WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION

WASHINGTON UTILITIES AND TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION,

Complainant,

v.

PACIFICORP dba PACIFIC POWER & LIGHT COMPANY

Respondent.

Docket UE-230172

# PACIFICORP

## **EXHIBIT OF THOMAS R. BURNS**

# **Rock River Analysis**

Table 7 Rock River 1 110%PTC

	PVRR(d) Net (Benefit)/Cost (\$million)	Nom. Lev. Net Benefit (\$/MWh of Incremental Energy)
High Natural Gas, High CO <sub>2</sub>	(\$91.69)	\$43/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, Medium CO <sub>2</sub>	(\$54.09)	\$25/MWh
Low Natural Gas, No $CO_2$	(\$15.12)	\$7/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, SCGHG	(\$167.35)	\$78/MWh

Table 1 Rock River 1 60%PTC

	PVRR(d) Net (Benefit)/Cost (\$million)	Nom. Lev. Net Benefit (\$/MWh of Incremental Energy)
High Natural Gas, High CO <sub>2</sub>	(\$67.76)	\$31/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, Medium CO <sub>2</sub>	(\$30.15)	\$14/MWh
Low Natural Gas, No $CO_2$	\$8.82	(\$4/MWh)
Medium Natural Gas, SCGHG	(\$143.42)	\$67/MWh

Table 1 Rock River 1 110% vs 60%PTC

	PVRR(d) Net (Benefit)/Cost (\$million)	Nom. Lev. Net Benefit (\$/MWh of Incremental Energy)
High Natural Gas, High CO2	(\$23.94)	\$11/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, Medium CO2	(\$23.94)	\$11/MWh
Low Natural Gas, No CO2	(\$23.94)	\$11/MWh
Medium Natural Gas, SCGHG	(\$23.94)	\$11/MWh